Abstract In traditional aesthetics, the typical characteristic of aesthetic experience is said to be pure disinterested beauty.
distinction between reason and experience. The pragmatist notion of meaning undermines this dualism. This notion of meaning also serves as a basis for understanding Dewey's comments on the meanings typical in art. Finally, the emotionally expressive power of art requires an explanation. A discussion of all these points helps to clarify the character of the pragmatist notion of aesthetic experience developed below.
Philosophical naturalism
Generally speaking naturalism maintains that human beings are live distinguished from Quine's hard naturalism (Määttänen 2006 ).
According to Dewey, culture is a product of nature. He viewed science as problem solving. Naturalism involves no a priori commitment to the methods of natural science. Any method can be used if there is reason to assume that using it may produce information that helps to solve the problem at hand. The point of agreement between hard and soft naturalism is the conviction that classical epistemology is based on outdated metaphysical assumptions.
The way out of these assumptions is the conception that there is only one world, and we are in it. The world is causally closed. This entails that everything in the world proceeds through physical causal processes. There is no room for any immaterial consciousness having an effect on the causal processes. Mind is necessarily embodied. However, as we shall see in section 3, this does not necessarily entail that cognition must be reduced to brain processes.
What does follow is that all questions concerning the character of cognition are ultimately empirical questions. This is not to underestimate the need for abstract conceptual analysis, the traditional task of philosophers; but all abstract conceptions must have some connection to experience in order to be relevant for the scientific study of cognition.
Experience and the object of knowledge in pragmatism
The traditional view in philosophy is that experience is sense perception. Sense organs function as channels through which the internal mind observes the external world. Visual perception has dominated the discussion since it was discovered that the eye functions like a camera obscura. The retinal image was thought to continue to the brain and to change into a mental image. Other senses were analysed in a similar manner. The object of knowledge in this kind of approach is the external world as the hidden cause of perceptions. The hidden causes as such cannot, of course, be perceived, and therefore the task of the experiencing subject is to find out what we can really know about these hidden causes. They form the mind-independent real world that we must come to know.
This task is an issue even in the present day philosophy of science.
According to Charles Peirce the pragmatist conception of experience is broader than that of sense experience (CP 1.336). Action and practice are forms of experiencing and understanding the world. This is a major change in the notion of experience. In pragmatism the world is not experienced in the form of individual objects having certain qualities and mutual relations. The world is experienced as possibilities for action. The object of experience is not the perceived world but the objective conditions of action. These conditions are, of course, observed, but they do more: they shape our action (more about this in section 4).
Action as a mode of experience changes the former emphasis on to control the kinds of experiences we will encounter in the future if we perform certain acts.
In pragmatism the object of knowledge is thus defined in a different way. The classical epistemic relation between perceptions and their hidden causes is replaced by a relation between two situations: the one we are in at a certain moment and the other that is a consequence of our activities. As Dewey put it, the guided processes of change form the objects of knowledge (Dewey 1958, 160) .
Anticipation of the future is based on experience, which is a complex thing. Evolution has given us a history experience of 6 interacting with our environment. This interaction has shaped us as biological organisms. The ultimate reason for our having these organs is the fact that they have made it possible to stay alive on earth. It is also reasonable to believe that some of our inborn capacities, for example the capacity to learn natural languages, are at least partly an outcome of the evolutionary pressures created by the social and cultural environment of our ancestors. According to Merlin Donald, symbols are a product of thought, not vice versa (Donald 2001, 276) , and these cognitive capacities must have 
Embodied mind
Naturalism entails that mind is necessarily embodied. The brain is the organ of thought, which is probably why the mind is sometimes An obvious but not so thoroughly investigated possibility is that the ability to think is not attributed to the brain and not even to the body as a whole but to the system of interaction between an organism and its natural and social environment. John Dewey criticized in 1896 the reflex arc concept and suggested that a concept of a sensorimotor circuit might do better (Dewey 1975a) . The difference between an arc and a circuit is precisely in the role of the environment. The objects of environment belong to "the functional organization of mind" (Määttänen 1993, 105) . In this approach, mind is constituted 
The notion of meaning in pragmatism
The minimum requirement of something having meaning is cognitive distance. Meanings enable one to think about something that is not immediately present. Language is a system of symbols and a powerful vehicle for thought. However, the pragmatist notion of meaning is wider. It covers both linguistic meanings and tacit (non-linguistic) meanings.
Habit of action as meaning
According to The pragmatist law of association provides the mechanisms for this. As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999) write, this Cartesian idea is based on a container metaphor. The familiarity of the metaphor makes the idea easy to understand and easy to adopt.
Language and meaning
Unfortunately it is also based on the outdated metaphysics of two different substances and keeps the external/internal dichotomy in force. Further, in pragmatist analysis meanings and thoughts are relations. Experience consists of a complex system of relations that are realized in the interaction between an organism and its natural and cultural environment. Relations don't have well defined locations and it would be a logical category error to reduce a relation to one of its elements.
From a pragmatist point of view this way of putting the question is misleading. A better way to approach the problem of linguistic meaning is to point out that we have two types of activities. We do something with linguistic expression and then we have other kinds of practical activities. A better question is to ask about the relationship between these activities. This is how John Dewey put it.
The word 'hat' gains meaning in the same way as a hat, namely by being used in a certain way (Dewey 1916, 18) . There is a clear analogy between the use of language and the use of other things, hats, tools and so on. Ludwig Wittgenstein, who famously applied the principle that meaning is use, also refers to this analogy (Wittgenstein 1975, 21) . 
Tacit meanings typical for art
In Art as Experience John Dewey distinguishes between linguistic meanings typical for scientific texts and meanings typical for art (Dewey 1980, 82-105) A situation is semantically dense. The same density of meanings applies to paintings. In this way, the meaning of a work of art as a whole is individualized.
The claim that art expresses meanings is open to misinterpretations.
Some aesthetic theories maintain that an artist expresses her inner mental life through an external object of art. This is something that Dewey would put into the category of "antiquated psychologies".
Meanings are ideas in the mind. Communication is transferring ideas
into other minds using language. Since works of art like musical works are not related to conscious ideas in the same way as words, the meanings in art and their communicativeness remain a mystery (Määttänen 2003) . This view retains the internal/external dichotomy of classical philosophy. In Dewey's aesthetics it is the meanings that are expressive as compared to those of a scientific text. This is not to deny the artists' role in creating expressive works of art. The point is that the word "expresses" is used in a different sense and that the philosophical framework is different.
The way out of the background assumptions of classical philosophy is indicated by Dewey's distinction between the object of art and the work of art. This distinction is also vulnerable to misinterpretations because a work of art is usually considered to be a physical object, for example, a canvas hanging on a wall. In Dewey's terminology a work of art is an experience, and experiences cannot hang anywhere.
An object of art may hang on a wall, but the work of art is that object as experienced. And the work of art as an experience is not something private and internal mental state. Dewey consistently criticized this kind of mentalist psychology. Experience is interaction with the environment, and some experiences can be classified as aesthetic (see section 7). The point is that experience (as well as the mind) is a relation (or a system of relations) between a living organism and its environment. A work of art is realized in ongoing experience.
Consider colors. They are experienced as properties of physical objects, but actually they are properties of interaction in the sense that they also depend on internal conditions (internal to the body, that is). Light and a reflecting surface are not enough. There has to be a certain kind of biological organism with eyes and other neural structures. These three conditions make it seem that, in actual interaction, colors are experienced as external to the body. There is no need to speculate about colors residing literally in the head as phenomenal qualities. In a similar way emotions are experienced as internal (to the body), but as we shall see in section 6, in pragmatism they are analyzed as qualities of action. A work of art consists of (actually or potentially) experienced qualities and, as such, it is a relation between an organism and the object of art that is a cause (but not the only cause) of the experienced qualities. Art itself is "a quality of activity" (Dewey 1980, 224 ).
An object of art is experienced as being expressive. Expressiveness is related to the character of tacit meanings typical for works of art.
A work of art is an object of art as understood and interpreted with various kinds of meanings. This holds also for individual qualities.
One cannot experience "pure" or "simple" qualities (Dewey 1980, 121) . A color as seen is qualified by "implicit reactions of many organs" (ibid., 122). Colors are charged with hidden consequences.
In other words, even simple qualities are experienced as belonging to the whole that consists of the present situation, possibilities for action and the anticipated outcomes of habitual activity. This gives the qualities meaning precisely in the sense of the pragmatist notion of meaning defined above.
The origin of tacit meanings is ultimately from our evolutionary experience. This entails that these meaning structures function largely subconsciously. It is unthinkable that we could remember what kinds of experiences led to the development of our sense organs, for example. However, these experiences have left their trace in the structure and mechanisms of our biological bodies and therefore effect how we experience, understand and interpret our 
Values and emotions
Antonio Damasio (1995) has put forth a hypothesis that he calls the somatic marker hypothesis. According to it emotions are signs of values. It proves to be useful in explaining why an aesthetic experience (in Dewey's sense) is emotionally charged. Damasio's views fit well with the pragmatist notion of meaning.
Facts and values in pragmatism
One of the misleading dichotomies in the classical philosophy is the dualism between facts and values. David Hume, in considering a murder, concluded that there are only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts but no other facts that could be called vice (Hume 1978, 468) . On the next page he presents the famous principle: no ought from is. These places in Hume's book are quoted quite often.
Between these passages Hume writes that vice and virtue are like sounds, colors, heat and cold in that they "are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind" (Hume 1978, 469 ). This sentence is not so often quoted. It is, however, important because it reveals the metaphysical framework of Hume's thought. This kind of dichotomy of external and internal is not tenable in consistent naturalism. Heat as molecular movement, as the current definition says, is obviously a property of sun, for example. And, as Hilary
Putnam points out, Hume advocates a kind of pictorial semantics (Putnam 2004, 15) . If something cannot be literally perceived here and now, it cannot belong to the world of facts. Hume's concept of experience admits only perceptions of particular sense qualities.
In pragmatism the notion of experience is different, as is the notion of fact. In pragmatism the world is not experienced as sense sense qualities. We cannot experience "pure" or "simple" qualities.
They are charged with hidden consequences and, therefore, also with an emotional flavor based on subconscious valuation. It is not accidental that red is experienced differently than blue or green. This is obviously related to the different role of these colors in our evolutionary history.
Dewey discussed this emotional charge and, for some reason, used in this context the German world Gefühlston, a tone of feeling (Dewey 1975b, 188) . Single experienced qualities also have this
Gefühlston that carries with it memories of past experiences. 
Aesthetic experience in pragmatism.
The basic aim of pragmatist aesthetics is to recover the connection between art and life. Crudely speaking, the concept and the practices of fine art (or polite arts for the polite classes, as was also suggested)
were created in the 1800 th century when the bourgeoisie removed paintings and statues to museums and galleries and developed a corresponding aesthetic theory with its principal concept of pure disinterested beauty (Mortensen 1997 , Shiner 2001 fearful. The point is that it is pursued for its own sake. Stendhal suggested that beauty is a promise of happiness. At a more general level we can say that an aesthetic experience is a promise of consummation, and this promise is enjoyable in itself.
The fact that an aesthetic experience is only a promise of actual consummation entails that it is not directly connected to action. It is not merely a means for other experiences. There is a difference between musical experiences and ticket buying experiences Aristotle distinguished between praxis and poiesis by saying that the goal, telos, of poiesis is something external to the activity while the goal of praxis is the activity itself (Aristotle 1999 (Aristotle , 1140b . The paradigmatic example of praxis is eudaimonia, the good life.
Aesthetic experiences are something that are pursued for their own sake, and therefore they are also suitable elements of Aristotelian praxis, good and happy life.
